

AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM AND PROGRESS

ADAFP

STATE OF SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AFRICA

Annual Assessment Report — 2026

Focus: The Sahel, Horn of Africa & Sudan | Elections: Uganda, Tanzania, Cameroon & Congo-Brazzaville |
Great Lakes Region | Foreign Military Bases | Xenophobia in South Africa

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Executive Summary

Africa in 2026 faces a crisis of compounding magnitude. The Sahel is ablaze with jihadist insurgencies that state armies and foreign partners have failed to contain. The Horn of Africa remains trapped in the world's worst humanitarian catastrophe, with Sudan's civil war displacing millions and threatening regional stability. The Great Lakes region has seen the collapse of multiple peace agreements in eastern DRC even as diplomatic processes multiply. In East Africa, Uganda's January 2026 elections deepened fears about the permanent entrenchment of authoritarian rule — a pattern replicated by Tanzania's catastrophically violent October 2025 election. In Central Africa, Cameroon's 93-year-old president has used constitutional amendments to engineer his own succession while the Anglophone conflict festers, and the Republic of Congo's Sassou Nguesso has extended his 42-year rule with a 95% landslide built on suspended opposition parties and a nationwide internet blackout. And in South Africa — the continent's most industrialised economy — xenophobic violence has returned as a symptom of governance failure and political manipulation.

This report, issued by the African Democratic Alliance for Freedom and Progress (ADAFP), offers an evidence-based assessment of these crises and proposes a framework for democratic, inclusive, and pan-African responses. It draws on field-sourced documentation, electoral observation data, and ADAFP's own operational experience on the ground across 22 member countries.

Our central finding is unambiguous: the intertwining of governance failure, foreign interference, resource competition, and democratic regression has produced a continent at a critical juncture. Yet it is also a continent of extraordinary resilience — of youth movements, civic coalitions, and democratic actors who are building the foundations of a different future.

ADAFP stands with these forces. This report is our contribution to their struggle.

Part I — The Sahel: Conflict, Governance Collapse, and External Interference

1.1 The Mali Crisis: Internal Dynamics and Geopolitical Drivers

The crisis in Mali, which erupted visibly in 2012, is best understood not as an isolated security failure but as a spatio-temporal conflict in which geography and history are active drivers, not passive backdrops. The north and centre of the country — vast, arid, and ethnically diverse — have experienced decades of political neglect by successive governments in Bamako. Poor resource distribution, absent public services, and chronic underrepresentation fed grievances that eventually metastasised into armed rebellion and jihadist recruitment.

Since 2015, the conflict has migrated southward into central Mali, engulfing communities across ethnic lines. The Dogon-Fulani tensions over land and water — between sedentary farming communities and pastoral nomads — represent a layer of resource competition that military strategies have consistently failed to address. With 375,000 people internally displaced in the Mopti region alone, and with state services either absent or predatory, the humanitarian toll is staggering.

ADAFP Condemnation — Bamako Attacks, April 27, 2026

The African Democratic Alliance for Freedom and Progress expresses its deep consternation and absolute indignation at the spiral of violence striking the Republic of Mali. The coordinated terrorist attacks targeting Bamako, Kidal, and Gao constitute an exceptionally grave assault on national sovereignty and the stability of the entire Sahel region. It is with immense sorrow that the Alliance learned of the tragic death of the Minister of Defense, Mr. Sadio Camara. The Alliance condemns in the strongest possible terms these criminal and cowardly acts, which seek to decapitate defense institutions and sow chaos.

1.2 The Geopolitical Dimension: Algeria, the Maghreb, and the Moroccan Sahara Question

Any serious analysis of the Malian crisis must move beyond its internal dynamics to engage the shifting regional landscape in which it is embedded. The crisis is not only a Sahelian issue — it is inseparably connected to Maghreb rivalries, the evolving politics of the Moroccan Sahara question, and the strategic recalibrations of major powers whose interests in the region extend far beyond Mali's borders.

The Algerian dimension is particularly consequential and has been systematically underanalysed in Western frameworks. Algeria has historically positioned itself as the indispensable mediator of Sahelian conflicts — the architect of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement between the Malian government and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), and a self-appointed guarantor of stability across the Sahel's northern tier. This mediating role gave Algiers significant political leverage over Bamako and the armed groups of northern Mali, reinforcing Algeria's claim to regional primacy in a sub-region it considers its strategic backyard.

That leverage has been sharply diminished by a diplomatic rupture of significant consequence. Mali's withdrawal of its recognition of the so called Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) — a long-standing position of sponsoring the Polisario Front that Algeria has backed with unwavering consistency — represents a direct rebuke to Algiers and a deliberate realignment toward Morocco's position on the Moroccan Sahara question. For Algeria, whose foreign policy identity is deeply invested in the Polisario group, presented as an anti-colonial struggle and a pillar of its own legitimacy, this shift was not merely a bilateral diplomatic dispute. It was a signal that the Sahelian states whose

stability Algeria had claimed as its strategic responsibility were now charting independent courses — including toward Rabat, Washington, and Moscow — that bypassed Algerian mediation entirely.

Algeria's response has been marked by a combination of diplomatic pressure and strategic disengagement that has, paradoxically, created space for other actors to fill. The withdrawal of French forces, the arrival of Russian contractors, the growing Moroccan economic and diplomatic footprint in West Africa, and the US and EU recalibration of their Sahel strategies have all occurred against the backdrop of a weakening Algerian capacity to shape events. Recent UN Security Council resolutions on Moroccan Sahara — which have increasingly affirmed the Moroccan autonomy proposal as a credible basis for negotiation — and EU and US statements that have moved progressively toward recognising Moroccan sovereignty claims, further erode the regional and international foundation on which Algeria's Polisario support rests.

ADAFP's assessment is that the security of Mali cannot be dissociated from this broader Maghreb dynamic. The diplomatic realignment of Sahelian states away from Algerian tutelage — whether toward Russia, Morocco, or new configurations — reflects a genuine search for pragmatic partnerships that prioritise stability, economic development, and sovereignty over Cold War-era solidarity frameworks. This is a legitimate aspiration. But it also creates new risks: the fragmentation of regional mediation, the erosion of the Algiers Agreement's institutional architecture, and the potential for Algeria to shift from mediator to spoiler in northern Mali's conflict dynamics. ADAFP calls for a structured dialogue involving Algeria, Morocco, Mali, and the broader Sahel-Maghreb contact group to ensure that geopolitical competition does not further destabilise communities already bearing the weight of a decade of conflict.

1.3 Russia's Evolving Role: From Wagner to African Corps

Russia's involvement in Mali has undergone a significant transformation: what began as a shadowy mercenary operation under the Wagner Group has evolved into a formalised, state-controlled military partnership through the so-called African Corps. This rebranding represents a deliberate Kremlin strategy — maintaining operational control and resource extraction benefits while acquiring the political legitimacy of a bilateral security agreement.

The consequences for Malian sovereignty are severe. The military junta's dependency on Russian military support has narrowed the space for civilian governance, undermined democratic transition timelines, and insulated the regime from accountability. In exchange, Russia secures privileged access to Mali's mineral wealth and the geopolitical leverage of a permanent foothold in the Sahel.

ADAFP is deeply concerned that this model — the exchange of sovereignty for security against domestic populations — is being replicated across the Sahel, with consequences that will take a generation to reverse.

1.4 Structural Causes and Strategic Responses

Experts and ADAFP alike converge on a core diagnosis: purely military strategies have failed. Effective resolution requires a multidimensional political approach encompassing:

- Reopening negotiations with separatist groups to address long-standing regional grievances about land, representation, and cultural recognition
- Restoring civilian-led governance to rebuild international legitimacy and democratic accountability
- Implementing effective decentralisation that transfers real resources and decision-making power to peripheral communities
- Restoring basic state services — justice, healthcare, education — to weaken the recruitment power of extremist organisations

- Diversifying security partnerships beyond exclusive reliance on Russian contractors

ADAFP's International Relations Adviser Walter Torres Hernandez has proposed an innovative peace initiative focused on water and land conflict mediation in the Mopti region — the 'Peace through Water' framework — as a pilot project that the Alliance is developing in collaboration with the African Union, the Kingdom of Morocco, the African Development Bank, and Malian civil society organisations including AMSS, ARGA, and TASSAGHT.

The ADAFP model is clear: the Alliance does not substitute for state action or international institutions, but acts as a strategic facilitator — bringing ideas, networks, and continental legitimacy to strengthen indigenous peacebuilding capacities.

1.5 Burkina Faso and Niger: The Spreading Contagion

The security deterioration in Mali has metastasised across the Sahel. Burkina Faso and Niger — both governed by military juntas that have expelled French forces and turned to Russia — are experiencing catastrophic security collapses. Terrorist attacks on civilian populations, mass displacement, food insecurity, and the near-total withdrawal of state authority from vast territories characterise both countries.

The regional architecture — G5 Sahel, Multinational Joint Task Force — has proven unable to contain violence at this scale. The retreat of Western partners, accelerated by the political decisions of the juntas, has left a vacuum that neither Russia nor local forces can fill militarily. ADAFP urges the African Union to convene an emergency Sahel summit, bringing together transitional governments, democratic civil society, and regional actors, to forge a renewed political framework grounded in civilian governance and inclusive dialogue.

Part II — The Horn of Africa and the Catastrophe of Sudan

2.1 Sudan: A War Without End

The war between Sudan's Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which erupted in April 2023, has become one of the most destructive conflicts on the African continent in the 21st century. Over 12 million people have been displaced — the largest displacement crisis in the world — and the country faces famine, epidemic disease, and the systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure.

The conflict is not merely a military confrontation between rival generals. It reflects deep structural failures: the unresolved legacy of Sudan's transition from the Bashir dictatorship, the integration of paramilitaries into the formal security architecture, and the failure to build civilian governance institutions capable of managing competing power centres. Foreign actors — including the UAE, Egypt, Russia, and others — have fuelled the conflict through arms supplies and diplomatic cover, making what began as an internal power struggle a proxy conflict with continental implications.

2.2 Recruitment of Sudanese into Foreign Conflicts

A particularly disturbing dimension of Sudan's crisis is the documented recruitment of Sudanese civilians into armed conflicts abroad — including into the Russian military's operations in Ukraine. Analysis by Sudanese researchers documents recruitment networks operating through intermediary

companies in Sudan, Egypt, the UAE, and Libya, offering monthly salaries of \$2,000–5,000 and promises of Russian citizenship to recruits drawn from communities devastated by the SAF-RSF war.

These recruitment mechanisms — which deploy visa-based entry systems, civilian-labelled contracts, and military intermediary companies to disguise what is in effect paid military service — constitute violations of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I prohibition on mercenaries, the 1989 UN Convention against Recruitment of Mercenaries, and the 2000 Palermo Protocol against trafficking in persons.

ADAFP condemns these practices categorically. Sudan's suffering must not be weaponised to supply cheap military labour to foreign powers. We call on the international community to sanction the intermediary companies involved, establish repatriation programmes for Sudanese trapped in Russian-controlled territories, and treat this phenomenon as the form of contemporary military slavery that it is.

2.3 Regional Implications: Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Architecture of Fragility

The Horn of Africa regional architecture remains profoundly fragile. Ethiopia — itself still recovering from the Tigray conflict — faces ongoing tensions in Amhara and Oromia regions, unresolved border disputes with Eritrea, and the geopolitical pressures of its quest for Red Sea access. Eritrea's authoritarian system shows no signs of reform. Somalia continues its generational struggle against Al-Shabaab.

ADAFP believes that the Horn of Africa requires a fundamentally new regional security architecture — one that prioritises civilian oversight, democratic governance, and the resolution of refugee crises through the African Union's Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with substantive engagement of civil society and democratic political forces.

Part III — The Great Lakes Region: Conflict, Displacement, and the Limits of Diplomacy

3.1 Geography, History, and Structural Drivers

The African Great Lakes region — spanning the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania, with the broader International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) framework encompassing eleven states — is a space where political borders have never neatly matched cultural, ethnic, and livelihood realities. The region draws its name from a series of extraordinary freshwater bodies — Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, Lake Kivu, Lake Albert, Lake Edward — that together contain approximately 25% of the planet's unfrozen surface freshwater. It is one of the most densely populated and ecologically rich zones on the continent.

It is also the epicentre of Africa's most protracted conflict system. The region's contemporary crisis traces directly to the 1994 Rwandan genocide — in which between 500,000 and one million people were killed in approximately 100 days — and the mass refugee flows that followed, which militarised eastern Congo and created armed group networks that have never been fully dissolved. The colonial-era Belgian decision to codify ethnic identity — institutionalising the Hutu-Tutsi distinction through identity cards and administrative hierarchies — created a political powder keg that post-independence governments exploited rather than resolved. Decades later, the unresolved legacies of that colonial imposition continue to drive conflict across borders.

Three structural drivers sustain violence in the Great Lakes today. First, the extraordinary mineral wealth of eastern DRC — coltan, gold, tin, tungsten, cobalt — creates economic incentives for armed

actors, neighbouring governments, and international supply chains to maintain conditions of controlled instability rather than genuine peace. Second, the persistent weakness of the Congolese state — whose authority in the east has never been effectively consolidated — produces governance vacuums that armed groups, proxy militias, and foreign forces fill. Third, unresolved questions of citizenship, identity, and belonging for Rwandophone communities in eastern DRC provide recurring justifications for both armed rebellion and foreign intervention.

3.2 The Regional Web: Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania

The Great Lakes conflict cannot be understood as a purely Congolese crisis — it is a regional system in which all neighbouring states are simultaneously actors, victims, and stakeholders. Rwanda's role in backing the M23 — denied by Kigali but documented by the UN Group of Experts, the United States, and independent researchers — is the most consequential external factor in the current cycle of violence. As of late 2024, the UN documented up to 4,000 Rwandan Defence Force troops operating inside DRC in support of M23 operations.

Uganda's position is complex: Kampala participates in the joint DRC-Uganda Operation Shujaa targeting the ADF (Allied Democratic Forces, an Islamic State-linked group responsible for hundreds of civilian deaths in North Kivu and Ituri), deploying over 3,000 troops in the east. Yet the UN Group of Experts has also cited evidence of Ugandan support to M23 — allegations Uganda denies. Burundi, meanwhile, has deployed thousands of soldiers in South Kivu to fight M23 and Rwandan forces, while its President Ndayishimiye has publicly accused Rwanda of planning to attack Burundi. The closure of the Burundi-Rwanda border in 2024 has deepened economic hardship across the sub-region.

Tanzania's political turbulence — particularly the violent aftermath of its 2025 elections — has added a further layer of regional instability. Over 60,000 Congolese refugees have fled into Burundi, while tens of thousands of Burundian refugees face pressure to return from Tanzania. Regional interdependence means that political crises in one country rapidly generate humanitarian consequences in its neighbours.

3.3 Mediation Architecture: Too Many Processes, Too Little Compliance

The Great Lakes region has been subjected to a proliferation of peace processes — the Nairobi Process, the Luanda Process, the Addis Ababa Framework, the Doha Process, the Washington Accords — each generating its own diplomatic momentum, its own commitments, and its own implementation failures. A January 2026 high-level meeting in Lomé, convened by AU Mediator and Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé with EAC, SADC, Angola, Burundi, France, Qatar, Rwanda, Uganda, and the US, acknowledged the urgent need to harmonise these competing frameworks and avoid fragmentation of mediation efforts.

The fundamental problem is not the absence of agreements but the absence of compliance. As the Institute for Security Studies has observed, 'silver bullet' solutions — such as the FDLR neutralisation that is central to the Washington deal — are unlikely to succeed without addressing the wider mobilisation dynamics reinforced by the continued presence of foreign forces. The economic incentives driving M23 and its external backers are not dissolved by diplomatic communiqués. Rwandan GPS jamming of humanitarian aircraft over the DRC — documented by ISS — while peace talks proceed in Washington captures the essential contradiction: actors can negotiate and fight simultaneously, as long as no enforcement mechanism compels compliance.

ADAFP's assessment is that the Great Lakes peace architecture requires fundamental reform: fewer parallel processes, stronger African Union leadership, mandatory reporting with public attribution of violations, and genuine economic conditionality that raises the cost of non-compliance for state actors. The US sanctions imposed in March 2026 on four Rwandan senior military officials and the

Rwandan Defence Force as an entity — in response to M23's capture of Uvira — represent a meaningful precedent. It must be systematised and extended.

3.4 Humanitarian Consequences and ADAFP's Position

The human cost of the Great Lakes conflict is staggering. Eastern DRC alone hosts nearly 7 million internally displaced persons. At least 7,000 people were killed in 2025 alone in DRC-related conflict. The M23 capture of Uvira in December 2025 killed at least 400 people and displaced over 200,000, with Médecins Sans Frontières documenting widespread sexual violence during the offensive. With the Goma and Bukavu airstrips closed, the Bujumbura airport — kilometres from the Burundi-DRC border — has become a critical lifeline for humanitarian operations, itself vulnerable to disruption.

ADAFP stands with the peoples of the Great Lakes — Congolese, Rwandan, Burundian, Ugandan, Tanzanian — who have borne the weight of a conflict sustained by the interests of elites, foreign powers, and global supply chains. We call for urgent humanitarian access, the immediate withdrawal of Rwandan forces from DRC, an end to all external support for armed groups, and a comprehensive peace conference grounded in Congolese sovereignty, inclusive governance, and transparent mineral trade. Peace in the Great Lakes is not achievable through piecemeal diplomacy — it requires a political settlement that addresses the root causes: colonial legacies of identity manipulation, resource governance failure, and the chronic weakness of the Congolese state.

Part IV — Electoral Authoritarianism: Uganda, Tanzania, Cameroon, and Congo-Brazzaville

The 2025–2026 electoral cycle across Central and East Africa has produced one of the most alarming concentrations of democratic regression in the continent's post-independence history. Four countries — Uganda, Tanzania, Cameroon, and the Republic of Congo — have held elections whose common feature is the systematic elimination of genuine competition. Together they reveal not isolated failures but a coherent regional model of electoral authoritarianism: incumbents using a shared toolkit of manipulation to perpetuate power while preserving the formal apparatus of democratic legitimacy.

4.1 Uganda: Manufactured Majorities and the Limits of Resistance

The January 15, 2026 presidential and parliamentary elections in Uganda provide a textbook illustration of how authoritarian incumbents use the formal apparatus of electoral democracy to consolidate power while systematically dismantling the conditions that would make genuine competition possible.

The Electoral Commission declared President Yoweri Museveni re-elected with approximately 71–72% of the vote, compared to approximately 24–25% for National Unity Platform candidate Robert 'Bobi Wine' Kyagulanyi. The jump from Museveni's reported 59% in 2021 to 72% in 2026 — in an environment of intensified repression — strains credulity and fuels well-founded opposition and observer concerns about the integrity of the count.

Electoral Environment

The environment in which these elections took place was characterised by:

- Mass arrests of NUP members, organisers, and supporters throughout the campaign period
- House arrest and raids on opposition leadership
- Repeated internet blackouts that prevented independent reporting and vote verification
- Violence and intimidation at rallies and polling stations

- Severely restricted access for impartial international observers

International human rights organisations — Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International — and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights explicitly condemned the 2026 crackdown as more severe than 2021.

ADAFP Assessment: Opposition Capacity and Structural Constraints

Despite these conditions, Uganda's opposition — particularly the NUP — demonstrates real and significant intermediation capacity: strong urban and youth mobilisation, a clear political brand, and a meaningful parliamentary presence. These are not negligible achievements under a government of Museveni's sophistication.

Yet the opposition's ability to convert this mobilisation into electoral victory is structurally constrained by security-sector loyalty to the incumbent, an Electoral Commission lacking genuine independence, and information-control tools — particularly internet blackouts — that strike directly at the opposition's verification and coordination capacities.

ADAFP's assessment, consistent with its Tactical Manual for Democratic Movements Under Authoritarian Rule, is that democratic transfer of power in Uganda will require not a single election but a convergence of sustained civic pressure, elite fractures within the security establishment, robust parallel vote tabulation with international backing, and coordinated diplomatic and sanctions pressure on key individuals.

Recommendations for Uganda

- Prioritise Parallel Vote Tabulation: professionalise PVT infrastructure with secure reporting tools, geographic coverage, and rapid publication protocols
- Harden communications against shutdowns through mesh networks, radio, SMS chains, and diaspora broadcasting
- Build rural-urban coalitions to reduce ruling party's patronage monopoly in peripheral regions
- Maintain and expand parliamentary presence as an institutional foothold for democratic contestation
- Coordinate international advocacy with domestic evidence to raise the diplomatic cost of repression

4.2 Cameroon: Constitutional Engineering and the Anatomy of Dynastic Succession

Cameroon presents one of the most disturbing cases of long-term democratic regression on the African continent — not only because of its duration but because of the audacity with which the Biya government has now moved to institutionalise its hold on power through constitutional engineering. President Paul Biya, who has been in power since 1982 — 44 years and counting — is the world's oldest sitting head of state at 93. He presides over a country engulfed in armed conflict, burdened by a captured electoral system, and now subjected to a constitutional amendment whose implications for democratic governance are deeply alarming.

The Anglophone Crisis: A War Without Resolution

Since 2017, the Northwest and Southwest regions — predominantly English-speaking areas federated into Cameroon from British trusteeship in 1961 — have been the site of an armed conflict between Ambazonian separatist movements and the Cameroonian military. The conflict has produced at least

6,000 deaths, displaced over half a million people, and left 1.3 million in need of humanitarian aid. Systematic atrocities have been documented on all sides.

The roots of the crisis run deep. The abolition of the federal structure in 1972 — replaced by a unitary state that steadily marginalised Anglophone institutions, legal systems, and professional life — was never genuinely addressed. When mass protests erupted in 2016 over the imposition of French-speaking lawyers and teachers on Anglophone courts and schools, the government responded with military force, transforming peaceful civic protest into armed separatist insurgency. A decade later, the Biya government continues to treat the Anglophone crisis as a security problem to be suppressed rather than a political problem to be resolved. No inclusive national dialogue has taken place. The grievances that ignited the conflict remain entirely unaddressed.

The electoral framework has been thoroughly captured. The 2008 constitutional revision removed presidential term limits. The ruling CPDM party controls the judiciary, media regulatory bodies, and electoral administration. The parliament, whose mandate has been extended twice beyond its legal term — most recently to December 2026 — was elected in 2020 under conditions that gave Biya's party near-total dominance. It is this parliament — whose legitimacy opposition figures openly challenge — that adopted the April 2026 constitutional amendment.

The April 2026 Constitutional Amendment: Succession by Appointment

On April 4, 2026, in a joint session of the National Assembly and Senate convened at Biya's urgent request with only days' notice, Cameroon's parliament adopted a landmark constitutional amendment by 200 votes to 18, with the main opposition party boycotting the session. The amendment — submitted to parliament on April 2, just 48 hours before the vote — fundamentally restructures the country's line of succession.

The key provisions are as follows. The amendment restores the post of Vice President of the Republic, a position abolished by the 1972 constitutional referendum that dismantled Cameroon's federal structure and eliminated the Anglophone regions' institutional autonomy. Under the new framework, in the event of a presidential vacancy — death, resignation, or permanent incapacity — the Vice President automatically assumes power and serves out the remainder of the seven-year term. This replaces the previous arrangement under which the President of the Senate would serve as interim leader and organise fresh elections within 120 days. Critically, the Vice President is directly appointed and can be dismissed by the President at will, deriving legitimacy entirely from the head of state rather than a popular mandate. The Vice President may not initiate constitutional amendments or stand in a subsequent presidential election.

The Amendment: Stability Mechanism or Dynastic Vehicle?

Supporters argue the reform ensures continuity and prevents destabilising snap elections during active armed conflict. Some note that an Anglophone Vice Presidential appointment could gesture toward power-sharing. But opposition figures respond that the amendment fails to guarantee democratic legitimacy, inclusiveness, or institutional balance — and that a Vice President chosen and dismissable by the president cannot represent the people. The Social Democratic Front called it a step toward 'monarchy.' Maurice Kamto of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement described it as a 'constitutional and institutional coup' building a 'republican monarchy.' Most alarming: reports — denied but not definitively refuted — that Biya's son Franck Emmanuel Biya was named to the post by presidential decree on April 4, 2026. Franck Biya has no electoral mandate, no governmental experience, and is known primarily as a businessman. His appointment, if confirmed, would represent a textbook dynastic succession.

The context of the amendment's adoption is as significant as its content. The parliament that passed it has had its mandate extended twice by the executive beyond its constitutionally mandated five-year

term. The process — a 48-hour urgency procedure for a constitutional revision of historic consequence — bypassed all meaningful public consultation. A senior senator from Biya's own CPDM described the process as 'suspicious.' The Cameroon Bar Association warned that the amendment 'undermines the constitution and erodes the democratic legitimacy of the presidential office.'

For the Anglophone crisis, the amendment carries a particularly bitter irony: the vice presidency was abolished in 1972 precisely when Cameroon's federal structure — which had protected Anglophone autonomy — was dismantled. Its restoration now, under terms that give the president total control over the appointee, is not a restoration of federal principles. It is a succession instrument masquerading as institutional modernisation.

ADAFP's assessment is unambiguous. The April 2026 constitutional amendment is not institutional modernisation — it is the legal architecture of managed dynastic succession. Adopted by a parliament of questionable legitimacy, through a process that excluded public deliberation, in a country where opposition parties are systematically suppressed and an armed conflict rages in part because of the very constitutional changes of 1972 that this amendment echoes, it represents a further step toward the consolidation of one-party, one-family rule in Cameroon.

Most fundamentally, the amendment moves Cameroon further away from the inclusive national dialogue that civil society, the Anglophone regions, and the international community have demanded. Constitutional change imposed from above, in the absence of a peace process and genuine political inclusion, will deepen the grievances driving the separatist conflict rather than resolve them. ADAFP calls for genuine, internationally facilitated national dialogue; constitutional reform rooted in democratic participation rather than presidential appointment; and accountability for the decade of atrocities in the Anglophone regions — from all parties to the conflict.

4.3 Republic of Congo: Forty-Two Years and a Fifth Term

On 15 March 2026, the Republic of Congo held presidential elections that produced a result as predictable as it was disturbing: Denis Sassou Nguesso — who has ruled the country for a cumulative 42 years, having first come to power in 1979, lost the country's first multiparty election in 1992, and returned by force after a civil war in 1997 — was declared re-elected to a fifth consecutive term with 94.82% of the vote. His nearest challenger received a mere 1.48%. Freedom House gave the country a score of 2 out of 40 for political rights in its most recent report, one of the lowest on the continent.

The election was systematically engineered to foreclose competition. In June 2025, the Ministry of Interior suspended 15 opposition parties, several of which had been forming a coalition — the Alliance for Democratic Alternation — to contest the vote. The Electoral Commission, whose members are selected by the ruling-party-controlled National Assembly, denied certificates of recognition to key formations. Major opposition parties boycotted the vote, calling it a farce. Human rights activists were arrested in the lead-up to polling day. The internet was shut down nationwide on election day. Sassou Nguesso was the only candidate permitted to travel the country to canvass voters, while opposition campaigners operated under severe restrictions.

The reported turnout of 84.65% — with 2.6 million ballots said to have been cast — contradicted the observable reality: polling stations across the capital Brazzaville saw short or empty queues. Local residents told reporters they saw no point in voting because the outcome was predetermined. One voter captured the general sentiment: 'Everyone knows that, faced with his six inexperienced opponents, President Denis Sassou Nguesso will be re-elected with a high score as usual.'

The constitutional referendum of 2015, which removed presidential age and term limits, allowed Sassou Nguesso to run again at age 82. The constitution now bars him from the 2031 election — yet he has named no successor and offered no transition plan, raising the prospect of a destabilising succession struggle in a country with no institutional tradition of peaceful power transfer. The oil-rich

country carries international debt at 94.5% of GDP, a stark paradox of resource wealth and chronic underdevelopment produced by four decades of authoritarian kleptocracy.

ADAFP condemns the March 2026 election in the Republic of Congo as a fraudulent exercise that mocks the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. We call on the African Union and the Economic Community of Central African States to conduct a serious review of electoral conditions in Congo-Brazzaville and to engage the government, with real conditionality, on a credible democratic reform roadmap.

4.4 Tanzania: Democratic Tradition Destroyed

Among the most devastating democratic reversals of 2025 was Tanzania's general election on 29 October. The country had maintained a relatively functioning multiparty system since 1992 — never producing a transfer of power from CCM, but at least tolerating significant opposition participation in every election. That tradition was dismantled in 2025 in a process that The Economist described as CCM's 'Tiananmen Square moment.'

The elimination of credible competition began months before election day. In April 2025, Chadema chairman Tundu Lissu was arrested on treason charges after leading a 'no reforms, no election' campaign calling for electoral reform, then barred from standing. The party itself was subsequently disqualified when authorities claimed it had missed the deadline to sign an electoral code of conduct — a procedural trap that removed Tanzania's largest opposition party from the entire ballot. A second major opposition contender, Luhaga Mpina of the Alliance for Change and Transparency, was barred in September. For the first time since multiparty elections began, Tanzania went to the polls with CCM largely unchallenged.

The results reflected the elimination of competition: CCM won 270 of 272 directly elected parliamentary seats; President Hassan was declared winner with 97.66% of the presidential vote. This occurred despite an electorate of over 37 million voters — five times larger than when CCM last faced comparable levels of non-competition in the one-party era.

Tanzania's Election Violence: Historic and Unprecedented

Opposition party Chadema documented between 700 and 2,000 deaths in election protests — a toll that, if confirmed, would exceed even the 2007–2008 Kenyan post-election crisis. The UN Secretary-General expressed deep concern and urged all parties to 'prevent further escalation.' Foreign ministers of the UK, Canada, and Norway jointly cited 'credible reports of a large number of fatalities.' The UK advised against all but essential travel to Tanzania. Tanzania's Catholic Archbishop, at a funeral service, stated: 'The punishment for protests is not to shoot and kill.' Tanzanian prosecutors charged at least 240 people with treason and criminal conspiracy for post-election protest participation.

For ADAFP, Tanzania's 2025 election is a warning that no country is structurally immune to democratic regression. President Hassan, when she came to power in 2021, had signalled a reformist impulse — lifting bans on political rallies, initiating dialogue with the opposition. The subsequent reversal into the most repressive election in Tanzanian history illustrates how quickly democratic gains can be reversed when institutions lack genuine independence. Tanzania's constitution has never been overhauled since the one-party era; it features unchecked executive power as a design feature, not a flaw. The structural vulnerability this created was not corrected — it was exploited.

The economic implications will compound the political damage. Tanzania was positioned as a potential anchor economy of East Africa, with a rapidly growing population projected to double by 2050, significant natural resources, and increasing trade integration. Investors, development partners, and

regional neighbours will now factor the 2025 crackdown into their risk assessments. Democratic credibility and economic opportunity are not separable variables.

ADAFP calls for an independent AU-led investigation into the deaths during Tanzania's election protests; the immediate release of all political prisoners including Tundu Lissu and others detained on politically motivated charges; and genuine constitutional reform dialogue as a precondition for restoring Tanzania's international standing.

4.5 The Systemic Danger: Electoral Unfairness and the Threat to Peaceful Transfer

Uganda's manufactured 72% majority, Congo-Brazzaville's 95% landslide, Tanzania's effective elimination of all opposition, and Cameroon's frozen authoritarian system — taken together — reveal not isolated aberrations but a coherent regional system of electoral authoritarianism. Incumbents across Central, East, and West Africa have mastered a shared toolkit: opposition disqualification, internet blackouts, arrest of key figures, suspension of parties, control of electoral commissions, and constitutional amendments that remove term or age limits. The formal apparatus of elections is preserved while the conditions for genuine competition are systematically destroyed.

The danger this poses to peaceful power transfer is existential. When elections lose their function as genuine mechanisms of popular will, they become rituals of incumbent legitimation. The pressure that cannot be released through the ballot accumulates. The question is not whether that pressure will find another outlet, but when and in what form. Tanzania's post-election deaths — numbering in the hundreds, possibly thousands — illustrate one trajectory. The Sahel's military coups, removing governments whose electoral legitimacy had evaporated, illustrate another. Both are catastrophic alternatives to peaceful democratic transfer.

ADAFP's message to Africa's governing elites is unambiguous: the long-term cost of preventing peaceful transfers of power through electoral manipulation far exceeds the short-term cost of accepting competitive elections. Manufactured majorities do not produce stable governance — they produce crises deferred, and deferred crises invariably arrive with compound interest. ADAFP calls on the African Union, ECOWAS, EAC, SADC, and ECCAS to develop enforceable electoral integrity standards with genuine monitoring mechanisms and credible consequences for violations. Post-hoc condemnation without structural enforcement is insufficient. African democracy requires African accountability — with teeth.

Part IV-B — Foreign Military Presence in Africa: Sovereignty, Dependency, and the Russia–Port Sudan Case

4-B.1 The New Scramble: From Colonialism to Base Competition

Africa has become one of the most contested theatres of great-power military competition in the 21st century. The United States, France, China, Turkey, the UAE, and Russia all maintain or actively pursue military footholds on African soil. The United States operates Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and installations across the Sahel and East Africa. France maintained bases across 14 former colonies — a presence now being forcibly expelled by Sahel juntas. China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. Russia, through the Wagner Group and now the African Corps, has established military presence in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Libya, the Central African Republic, and Sudan.

ADAFP does not adopt a position of reflexive opposition to all external security partnerships — African states have legitimate security needs that may require international cooperation. But we insist any foreign military presence meet four criteria: it must be sanctioned by a civilian government with a genuine democratic mandate; subject to parliamentary oversight and public accountability; serve African peoples' security interests rather than foreign geopolitical interests; and be compatible with African regional security architecture. By these criteria, several current foreign military presences fail entirely — and the Russian push for Port Sudan is the most alarming current case.

4-B.2 The Port Sudan Naval Base: History, Status, and Implications

Russia's quest for a permanent naval base at Port Sudan has a complex history stretching back to the Bashir era. An initial agreement was signed in 2017, providing for a logistics facility housing up to 300 personnel and four warships including nuclear-powered vessels, with a 25-year term and automatic renewal. After Bashir's fall in 2019, successive transitional governments suspended, reviewed, and renegotiated the deal under pressure from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf partners.

The civil war between the SAF and RSF transformed the calculus. Sudan's military leadership, desperate for weapons, revived the base offer as a quid pro quo for Russian hardware — specifically S-300PMU2 air defence systems, Buk-M2E, and Pantsir-S1 systems capable of affecting the battlefield balance against RSF drones and munitions. In February 2025, Sudan's Foreign Minister Ali Youssef Ahmed al-Sharif confirmed in Moscow that 'there are no obstacles, we are in complete agreement.' Russian President Putin referred the agreement to the State Duma for ratification. Russia's Foreign Ministry subsequently declared the agreement 'binding for both parties.'

Strategic Significance of Port Sudan

Port Sudan sits at the junction of three critical corridors: the Red Sea (carrying approximately 12% of global trade), the Suez Canal approaches, and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Russian warships armed with Kalibr cruise missiles — with ranges exceeding 1,500 km — stationed at Port Sudan could project force across the Arabian Peninsula, the Suez Canal zone, and the northern Indian Ocean. The Wall Street Journal quoted a senior US official warning that a Russian base 'could expand Moscow's capacity to use force and allow it to operate without restraint.' Unlike Tartus in Syria — operationally constrained and now threatened following the Assad regime's fall — Port Sudan would offer Russia a strategically superior and more secure alternative.

The status of the agreement has oscillated in what analysts describe as Burhan's 'defensive pragmatism.' In November 2025, Russia's ambassador announced a temporary suspension. In December 2025, Burhan reportedly told Saudi authorities the project was frozen, using the suspension as leverage to secure Western and Gulf diplomatic backing for his military campaign against the RSF — and to explore alternative offers including preliminary discussions about a US military facility and intelligence cooperation channels. The Russian Foreign Ministry insists the agreement remains legally binding.

ADAFP is unambiguous: the Port Sudan naval base, in any form, is incompatible with Sudanese sovereignty and the interests of the Sudanese people. It is being negotiated not by a legitimate civilian government, but by a military leadership fighting a civil war that has produced the world's largest displacement crisis. Mortgaging Sudan's strategic Red Sea assets — its most valuable geopolitical resource — to obtain weapons to fight its own population is not statecraft. It is the self-perpetuation of a military regime at the cost of Sudanese sovereignty and future generations' interests.

4-B.3 The Russian African Corps: Structural Capture Across the Sahel

Russia's transformation of the Wagner Group into the African Corps — operating under direct state control with formal bilateral security agreements — represents the most systematic attempt to institutionalise military influence in Africa since the Cold War. The African Corps model is consistent: a military government facing insurgency invites Russian forces, expelling Western partners; Russian advisers embed with host-country militaries; Russian entities obtain mining concessions and strategic infrastructure access; the client government provides diplomatic support for Russia in international forums. The host country gains short-term military support; Russia gains long-term strategic assets and resource rents.

The human rights record across these deployments is catastrophic. In Mali, a massacre at Moura in 2022 killed hundreds of civilians. In the Central African Republic, Russian-linked forces have been implicated in widespread atrocities. Impunity is structural — protected by Russian diplomatic cover and the political dependence of client governments. For Sudanese citizens recruited into Russian operations in Ukraine — and documented by Sudanese researchers — the human cost is measured in lives lost and families receiving no compensation.

4-B.4 Principles for Legitimate Security Partnerships

ADAFP calls on the African Union to develop a continental framework for foreign military presence grounded in: democratic accountability (approval by a civilian-led government and parliamentary ratification); transparency (public disclosure of all terms and conditions); African primacy (subordination to APSA, the African Standby Force, and regional security bodies); human rights conditionality (AU monitoring with clear suspension mechanisms); and sovereignty protection (no provisions compromising host-country control of resources, territory, or foreign policy).

Africa's security challenges are real. But replacing French forces with Russian contractors is not strategic autonomy — it is substituting one dependency for another that is more opaque and less accountable. The path to genuine African security runs through African institutions, African governance, and African solidarity.

Part IV-C — The DRC Peace Agreement: Promise, Fragility, and the Long Road to Stability

4-C.1 The Washington Accords: A Diplomatic Milestone

The conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo reached a new peak of destruction in early 2025, when M23 forces — with what the United States, United Nations, and independent investigators describe as direct Rwandan military support — seized Goma and Bukavu, the provincial capitals of North and South Kivu. The offensive, described as the most significant escalation since the Second Congo War, displaced close to one million additional people and killed at least 7,000 in 2025 alone. Against this backdrop, intensive diplomatic engagement produced a series of agreements that offered — tentatively — a path toward de-escalation.

On June 27, 2025, the foreign ministers of the DRC and Rwanda signed the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity, under US auspices, calling for withdrawal of Rwandan troops from eastern DRC and an end to Congolese government support for the FDLR. A parallel Doha process, facilitated by Qatar, ran between Kinshasa and M23 directly, producing a framework agreement on November 15. On December 4, 2025, Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame signed the accords in a ceremony presided over by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, with President Trump calling it 'an amazing day for Africa.'

4-C.2 Immediate Collapse: Fighting Resumes Within Hours

The peace lasted hours. Fighting resumed on December 5 — the day after the signing ceremony. DRC President Tshisekedi told his parliament that Rwanda had carried out attacks in South Kivu province 'on the very day after the signing.' M23 advanced on Uvira — the last major urban centre in South Kivu not yet under rebel control — with the Congolese government documenting at least 400 deaths and 200,000 displaced within days. Thousands of civilians, mostly women and children, fled into Burundi and Rwanda. M23 forces shot down a Congolese army drone and recaptured strategic positions even as the ink dried in Washington.

The sequencing dispute at the heart of the agreement's failure is structural and deliberate. Rwanda insists it will withdraw troops only after the FDLR is neutralised; Kinshasa views this as a stalling tactic and argues both steps must occur simultaneously. Both sides have been formally accused of failing their June 2025 commitments: Rwandan forces remain on Congolese soil, Congolese army cooperation with the FDLR has continued, and the ceasefire has been repeatedly violated. The US State Department acknowledged it was 'deeply concerned by ongoing violence' and that 'actions on the ground do not yet align with commitments made.'

4-C.3 Structural Obstacles: Why Agreements Alone Cannot Produce Peace

Congolese civil society has met the peace process with deep scepticism rooted in experience. Reagan Miviri of the Ebuteli research group captured the prevailing view: 'The ceasefire has never been fully respected by either side, and front lines ignite even as dialogues are supposed to continue.' Stewart Muhindo of La Lucha stated bluntly: 'This divergence alone shows that they are signing commitments they never intended to implement.' Former President Kabila dismissed the Washington agreement as 'diplomatic theater.' Ten opposition parties jointly criticised the deal as reducing a complex multi-actor conflict to a bilateral framework ignoring the M23 and other armed groups.

Several structural obstacles explain the persistent gap between diplomatic agreement and sustainable peace:

- Economic incentives for continued conflict: M23 derives revenues of \$700,000–800,000 per month from mineral taxation in territories it controls; Rwanda's export economy benefits substantially from trafficked minerals; global technology supply chains absorb the output. These economic incentives are not dissolved by ceasefire agreements
- M23's parallel administration: the group has built an extensive administrative apparatus in areas under its control, collecting taxes, regulating trade, and providing services. Its demand to integrate the Congolese army 'not the other way around' reflects a position of entrenched strength that the Washington framework has not addressed
- FARDC structural weakness: the Congolese army's chronic inability to mount effective territorial defence — compounded by its ongoing operational reliance on the FDLR as a proxy — has made Rwanda's 'defensive measures' pretext credible to some international partners, even as those measures constitute a sovereignty violation
- Excluded actors: Pro-government Wazalendo militias, Burundian forces, and Uganda — all with thousands of troops operating in eastern DRC — are largely absent from formal peace frameworks. Agreements that do not bind the full range of armed actors are structurally incomplete
- Minerals-for-security dynamics: provisions in the Washington Accords expanding US access to Congolese critical minerals have generated civil society concern that the peace process serves economic positioning rather than conflict resolution, with Tshisekedi trading sovereign resource access for diplomatic backing

ADAFP welcomes the Washington Accords as diplomatic momentum that created space for dialogue. But we share Congolese civil society's assessment that sustainable peace requires far more than bilateral intergovernmental agreements. It requires a comprehensive framework addressing root causes: resource governance reform, citizenship and identity questions, structural strengthening of Congolese state institutions, accountability of external actors for their roles in fuelling war, and the genuine inclusion of Congolese civil society in the peace architecture.

ADAFP calls on the African Union, working with the UN Security Council, to convene a Great Lakes regional conference bringing together all armed actors, all neighbouring states, civil society organisations, and the international community around a framework grounded in Congolese sovereignty, inclusive governance, and transparent mineral trade — the only foundation on which durable peace can be built.

Part V — Xenophobia in South Africa: A Threat to Stability, Economy, and Pan-African Solidarity

5.1 The Pattern of Violence and Its Political Context

South Africa's recurring waves of xenophobic violence represent one of the most troubling contradictions in African political life: a country whose liberation was supported by the entire continent is now a site of organised violence against fellow Africans. The most recent surge — documented in 2026 — has seen attacks, intimidation, and vigilantism directed at African migrants in townships, urban centres, and commercial districts across the country.

This violence does not emerge from a vacuum. It is cultivated by political actors who deploy anti-migrant rhetoric to redirect popular anger away from the genuine causes of South Africa's economic crisis — corruption, state capture, infrastructure collapse, and unemployment — toward scapegoats who are visibly different and politically defenceless.

ADAFP Statement — 'Who Built This Freedom?'

History is an uncompromising witness. The liberation of South Africa was not a solitary achievement. It was sustained by the blood, treasure, and unwavering solidarity of nations across this continent — from Ghana and Nigeria to Zambia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. To turn against fellow Africans today is to betray the legacy of those who sheltered South African freedom fighters in their darkest hours. ADAFP calls on citizens to rediscover the spirit of Ubuntu — the fundamental understanding that our humanity is inextricably bound to one another.

5.2 Economic Consequences

The economic consequences of xenophobic violence extend far beyond the immediate destruction of migrant-owned businesses. South Africa's economic future is inseparable from continental integration under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and Agenda 2063. Xenophobic violence poisons the political soil in which these regional projects must grow.

- Investor confidence: Episodes of xenophobic violence damage South Africa's international image as a stable investment destination, particularly among African investors and development finance institutions
- Tourism: Violence against foreign nationals depresses regional tourism flows and disrupts the hospitality sector

- Trade relationships: Retaliatory measures and diplomatic tensions — as seen repeatedly with Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique — disrupt bilateral trade and undermine AfCFTA implementation
- Brain drain: Skilled African professionals reconsider South Africa as a destination, reducing the human capital benefits of regional mobility

The International Monetary Fund has projected continued GDP stagnation in South Africa absent structural reforms. Xenophobia accelerates economic decline by poisoning the country's relationships with the regional partners whose cooperation is indispensable for recovery.

5.3 The Constitutional and Moral Failure

South Africa's Constitution — one of the most progressive in the world — enshrines the right to dignity, equality, and protection for all persons within the country's borders, regardless of national origin. When state actors — police, local officials — fail to protect migrant communities or, worse, when political figures use inflammatory language that emboldens 'public thuggery,' they violate not only international human rights law but the foundational compact of South Africa's own democracy.

ADAFP calls on President Cyril Ramaphosa and the South African government to move decisively beyond rhetoric. The prosecution of those inciting violence, accountability for officials whose language emboldens attacks, and a genuine shift in political discourse from scapegoating to structural reform are urgent necessities.

5.4 Ubuntu and Pan-African Solidarity

The resolution of South Africa's xenophobia crisis cannot be purely technocratic or legal. It requires a political and moral commitment to Ubuntu — the African philosophical principle that our humanity is constituted through our relationships with others. This principle, invoked throughout the liberation struggle, must be reclaimed as the animating spirit of South Africa's public life.

Africa cannot build a prosperous, integrated, and free continent under Agenda 2063 while allowing xenophobia to consume the solidarity on which the continent's future depends. ADAFP calls on civil society organisations, youth movements, religious leaders, and political figures across South Africa to join us in a continental campaign for pan-African solidarity.

Part VI — The ADAFP Framework: A Third Way for African Democracy

6.1 Beyond Military Solutions and Authoritarian Stabilisation

The crises documented in this report share a common thread: the failure of approaches that privilege short-term stability over long-term democratic governance. Military solutions without political reform produce new cycles of violence. Authoritarian stabilisation without accountability produces the conditions for the next crisis. Foreign interference without genuine partnership undermines sovereignty and democratic development.

ADAFP's 'Third Way' offers an alternative framework grounded in three principles:

- Democratic primacy: genuine civilian oversight of security forces, independent electoral institutions, and protection of civic space as non-negotiable foundations of stability
- Inclusive governance: deliberate inclusion of women, youth, minority communities, and peripheral regions in political decision-making and economic opportunity

- Continental solidarity: pan-African cooperation based on mutual respect, shared democratic values, and collective action against both internal repression and external interference

6.2 Specific ADAFP Commitments

In response to the crises documented in this report, ADAFP commits to the following actions in 2026:

- Mali Peace Initiative: advancing the 'Peace through Water' framework in the Mopti region in partnership with the AU, Kingdom of Morocco, African Development Bank, and Malian civil society
- Sudan Advocacy: amplifying calls for an immediate ceasefire, humanitarian access, and an internationally facilitated transition process; documenting and denouncing the recruitment of Sudanese civilians into foreign armed conflicts; opposing the Russian naval base at Port Sudan
- Uganda Democratic Support: providing operational support to Ugandan democratic movements through leadership training, digital security assistance, electoral observation capacity-building, and international advocacy
- Cameroon Dialogue Facilitation: supporting calls for a genuine inclusive national dialogue that addresses both the Anglophone crisis and the conditions for democratic transition
- Congo-Brazzaville and Tanzania: advocating for AU-level electoral reform conditionality and independent investigation into Tanzania's election violence
- DRC Peace Support: advocating for a comprehensive Great Lakes conference that includes civil society, all armed actors, and transparent mineral governance as pillars of any lasting peace framework
- Foreign Military Bases Campaign: developing an ADAFP continental position on foreign military presence standards, working with AU member states to advance a framework for democratic accountability over all security partnerships
- South Africa Solidarity Campaign: launching a continental 'Ubuntu Solidarity' campaign in partnership with South African civil society to counter xenophobia and promote pan-African values
- Annual Democracy Report: producing an annual assessment of democratic governance across ADAFP's 22 member countries, providing an evidence base for international advocacy and targeted support

6.3 ADAFP's Role in the Tactical Manual for Democratic Movements

ADAFP's Tactical Manual for Democratic Movements Under Authoritarian Rule — developed in 2026 — provides an operational doctrine for democratic movements facing high repression, shrinking civic space, and pervasive surveillance. It integrates political strategy, digital security, legal defence, electoral integrity, psychological resilience, and community empowerment into a comprehensive framework.

The Manual identifies ADAFP as the continental democratic backbone providing operational support (leadership training, digital security, legal assistance, PVT support), organisational development, international advocacy, protection and rapid response, and long-term democratic reconstruction planning.

This is not an abstract mandate. It is the concrete operational expression of ADAFP's pan-African democratic mission.

Conclusion

Africa in 2026 stands at an inflection point. The crises documented in this report — the Sahel's descent into jihadist violence and authoritarian dependence on Russian military contractors; Sudan's catastrophic civil war and the threat of a Russian naval base at Port Sudan; Congo-Brazzaville's 42-year autocracy and Tanzania's bloodstained election; Uganda's manufactured majority and Cameroon's frozen Anglophone crisis; the fragile DRC peace agreements undermined by economic incentives for continued conflict; and South Africa's xenophobic betrayal of pan-African solidarity — all reflect the accumulated consequences of governance failure, foreign interference, and the subordination of democratic principles to short-term calculations of power.

Yet this report also documents extraordinary resilience: civic movements that organise under repression, opposition forces that contest stolen elections, communities that demand accountability, and civil society actors who build peace from below despite every structural obstacle. ADAFP exists to amplify, connect, and protect these forces.

The path to a free, just, and integrated Africa is not improvised. It is designed, disciplined, and executed with precision. ADAFP is committed to walking that path — with its member parties, its partners, and the democratic peoples of this continent — until freedom is no longer the exception in Africa, but the rule.

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